

Security Committee

SECOM-D-407

30 December 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM

FROM:

Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: APEX Issues

1. APEX Issue No. 4 addresses the matter of single security rules as being contentious and says that NSA and [ ] objects to their incorporation into APEX.

2. The way this issue is presented throws DCID 1/14 and the Physical Security Standards up for grabs.

3. The options for NFIB consideration at its 15 January meeting gives room for NFIB to do away with both of these SCI cornerstones.

[ ]

5. NSA wants no rules that will detract from DIRNSA's authority. [ ] wants to be sure standards remain high. They both accept DCID 1/14 and the Physical Security standards.

6. I've discussed this with Maynard Anderson who says he supports retention of existing personnel and physical security standards.

7. [ ] paper suffers from the need to boil down lots of material. He has closed out discussions of the issues and how they will be presented. Nonetheless I think he will be amenable to a proposal from you. I've drafted a revision and a cover memo from you to him. The fix excludes DCID 1/14 and the physical standards from the contention about "additional" rules that might weaken any uniform SCI proposal in the eyes of NSA and [ ]

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8. We really must fight this one and I suggest we get together with Harry to straighten out the matter. Further, you might want to attend the next Steering Group meeting on 6 January to make our case in person.

Attachment



25X1A

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

**Security Committee**

SECOM-D-408

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, APEX Steering Group

FROM:

Chairman

SUBJECT: APEX Issue #4: Single Security Rules

1. The statement of the issue related to the single set of uniform security rules and the accompanying discussion make it plain that NSA  object to incorporation into the APEX system of the existing rules governing personnel and physical security and document handling. The options prepared for NFIB's consideration range from elimination of the objective of requiring all SCI programs and areas to be governed by a single set of physical, personnel and document-proving security rules to adjusting existing systems to accommodate uniform security standards.

2. There is considerable concern among senior professional security officers over the impact of stating that a security threat is perceived by existing uniform security standards and criteria for the protection of and access to SCI. Both the percepts of a personnel security criteria and physical security standards are common to all systems incorporated in the SCI arena and have been for many years. The Intelligence Community has endorsed and approved these in both theory and practice. DCID 1/14 and the 1973 USIB approved physical security standards are the cornerstone of the SCI system. They are viable pronouncements and demonstrations of recognition that there is something special about SCI material that merits extraordinary security. DCID 1/14 and the extant physical security standards were adopted in their entirety in the APEX concept because of the universal regard accorded them throughout the Intelligence Community.

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3. As Chairman of the DCI Security Committee and as the Director of the Office of Security, CIA, I cannot endorse or condone any move that could result in denigration of these high standards. And I believe I speak for all members of the DCI Security Committee in this regard.

4. Accordingly I request that the expression of this issue be recast so as to eliminate by direct statement or by implication that DCID 1/14 and the Physical Security Standards for protection of SCI are viewed as contentious in the overall framework of the APEX proposal.

5. A line-in-line-out revision is attached for your consideration.



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Attachment

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SECOM/[redacted]fh (12/30/80)

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Issue #4: Single Security Rules

Statement of Issue

A single set of uniform security rules beyond those now extant for SCI (DCID 1/14 and the 1973 USIB Approved Physical Security Standards) is likely to be minimal, is not flexible, deprives program managers of control, exposes sensitive programs and ignores the special legal position of COMINT. ☐

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Proponents

NSA, ☐ ☐

Discussion

Basic to the SCI studies that led to APEX and to APEX itself is a widely held (but not universal) belief that a single set of SCI rules could reduce confusion (thereby improving security) and produce eventual economies, especially in industrial matters. These rules would be in addition to and supplement the present policy statement of DCID 1/14 Personnel Security Criteria for Access to SCI and the USIB approved physical security standards for protection of SCI. They would also standardize procedures for document handling.

-- Some are concerned that attempts to provide "uniform" rules will result in minimum rules. Some program managers are concerned that they will be forced to accept access requests that are based on less than full compliance with even "uniform standards." Introduction of new uniform rules will require transition and cause confusion.

-- Uniform rules will limit flexibility of its program managers to impose special conditions in special cases.

-- ☐ believes that uniform rules are not appropriate for "covert" contractual mechanisms used for streamlined management practice in space systems acquisitions.

-- Uniform SCI rules conflict with specific legal authority of SIGINT program managers. ☐

Options

1. Eliminate the objective of requiring --- security rules other than DCID 1/14 and the USIB approved physical security standards for protection of SCI.

2. Retain the (objective) of uniform rules for SCI (by implementing APEX).

3. Adjust existing systems to accommodate uniform security standards. ☐